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Abstract   
   
Why  people  pay  their  taxes  voluntarily  is  a  key  puzzle  in  the 
public finance literature. Some suggest that factors such as the level of 
tax  morale,  defined  as  the  intrinsic  motivation  to  pay  taxes,  affects 
compliance  behaviour.  While  there  have  been  numerous  studies  that 
have explored tax compliance or tax evasion, very few have explored the 
concept of tax morale in any detail. The basic intention of the empirical 
part is to analyse how fiscal autonomy affects tax morale in Germany. 
This also allows fill a gap in the tax compliance literature, which has 
rarely analysed the impact of fiscal autonomy on tax compliance or tax 
morale. Strong evidence has been found that a higher fiscal autonomy 
leads to a higher tax morale, controlling in a multivariate analysis for 
additional factors.  
Introduction 
Why do people pay taxes? This question has attracted increased 
attention in the tax compliance literature over the last few years. There 
is  still  a  lack  of  empirical  evidence  about  tax  morale,  defined  as  the 
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, although many researchers stress its 
relevance  to  understand  the  high  observed  level  of  compliance.  (e.g., 
Schwartz and Orleans, 1967; Lewis, 1982; Roth, Scholz and Witte, 1989; 
Alm et al., 1992, 1999; Pommerehne, Hart and Frey, 1994; Frey, 1997, 
2003; Frey and Feld, 2002, Feld and Tyran, 2002; Torgler, 2002). In fact, this  means  that  it  is  essential  to  obtain  more  empirical  insights, 
analysing tax morale as a dependent variable and to search for factors 
that shape tax morale.  
This  paper  uses  World  Values  Survey  (WVS)  and  European 
Values  Survey  (EVS)  data  from  1997  and  1999  to  investigate  if  the 
degree of local autonomy has an influence on tax morale, controlling for 
additional  variables.  Thus,  the  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  fill  a  gap 
identifying to which extent institutions have an impact on tax morale in 
Germany. 
During  the  last  few  years,  countless  studies  have  looked  at 
decentralisation trends worldwide and at the practical implementation of 
fiscal federalism. Numerous studies have analyzed the impact of fiscal 
federalism  on  the  size  of  government  (for  a  good  overview  see  Feld, 
Kirchgässner and Schaltegger, 2003). Further studies also analyzed the 
impact  of  decentralization  on  economic growth (see,  e.g.,  Davoodi and 
Zou,  1998) and stability (for example, Fukasaku and de Mello (1998) and 
Prud’homme,  1995).  Recent  studies  also  investigated  the  relationship 
between  decentralization  of  government  activities  and  corruption 
(Treisman,  2000;  Tanzi,  2000;  Fisman  and  Gatti,  2002)  or democratic 
participation  (Huther  and  Shad,  1998).  However,  in  many  areas  the 
empirical  evidence  is  mixed,  which  indicates  the  relevance  to  present 
more  empirical  results.  Thus,  it  is  highly  relevant  to  investigate  the 
relationship  between  fiscal  autonomy  and  taxpayers’  willingness  to 
contribute and pay taxes.  
In spite of numerous publications in this area, some proxies for 
fiscal decentralization used in the literature, especially in cross-country 
studies,  are  not  free  of  biases.  For  example  the  databases  of  the 
Government  Finance  Statistics  (GFS),  which  have  been  published 
annually  by  the  IMF  since  1970,  contain  certain  weaknesses.  On  the 
revenue side, the GFS does not distinguish whether taxes are collected 
via shared taxes, piggybacked taxes, and locally determined "own-source" 
taxes, nor what proportion of intergovernmental transfers is conditional, 
as  opposed  to  general-purpose  transfers  (Ebel  and  Yilmaz,  2001). 
Moreover,  in  some  cases  of  the  GFS  -- -  like  Italy  or  Belgium  -- -  the 
revenues of local and regional authorities are combined. (2) Thus, it may 
be useful to focus on one specific country such as Germany and try to 
develop a useful measure for fiscal autonomy. Therefore, novel compared 
to previous studies is to development a fiscal autonomy coefficient for the 
German states, based on aggregated communal data.  We first present a short outline of the structure of the financial 
system of Germany's municipalities. The next section is dedicated to the 
development  of  the  fiscal  autonomy  variable,  which  we  define  as 
FISCAUT  based  on  the  financial  code  numbers  of  the  municipalities, 
with  the  classification  based  on  the  sixteen  federal  states.  We  then 
introduces the theoretical approach and present the empirical evidence, 
using tax morale as dependent variable. The paper finishes with some 
concluding remarks.  
Local Public Finance in Germany  
Germany  is  a  federal  state  with  a  three-level  administrative 
structure. In addition to the federal government, whose ministries are 
based  both  in  Germany's  capital,  Berlin,  and  in  Germany's  former 
capital, Bonn, there are 16 federal states plus 13,897 municipalities.  
The towns and municipalities, which after numerous territorial 
reforms  in  the  respective  federal  states  between  1970  and  1977  have 
become  very  compact  with  regards  to  their  inhabitant  structures.  (3) 
These are the smallest local units in Germany. 
In Germany, tax revenues are distributed among the individual 
regional  administrative  bodies  using  both  own  assigned  revenues  and 
revenues sharing. This, for example, means that the tax receipts from 
the real property tax are available to the municipalities in full, while 
they also receive a fixed percentage of the tax receipts from the value 
added tax and the income tax.  The distribution of the most important 
tax revenues is reported in Table 1.  
After Germany's fiscal equalisation system was reformed by the 
so-called  "Solidarity  Pact  II"  (Spahn  and  Werner,  2004),  the  current 
discussion on federalism is now focused on the municipalities' finances, 
and there are numerous proposals for a reform in this context. However, 
in the field of local taxation, a few different suggestions exist, which do 
not solve the problems of local taxation completely. In particular, only 
very few reform proposals for the municipalities' finances take the real 
property tax into account (Werner, 2003), while the ideas discussed up to 
now either want to scrap the trade tax completely or "revitalise" it by 
broadening the assessment basis and the number of taxable people. In 
2001,  West  German  municipalities  had  revenues  of  105.1  billion  and 
East German municipalities had revenues of 19.9 billion EURO. Thus, for  the  West  German  municipalities,  tax  revenues  are  the  biggest 
revenue item, while the East German municipalities are mainly funded 
by  the  allocation  of  money  from  the  federal  states.  Within  the  tax 
revenue  section,  the  biggest  source  of  income  for  the  West  German 
municipalities is their fixed share of the personal income tax and the 
(local) trade tax. For the East German municipalities, on the other hand, 
the trade tax and the real property tax constitute the biggest revenue 
items. In addition to their fixed share of the PIT and VAT, municipalities 
in Germany are entitled to stipulate municipal assessment rates within 
the real property tax and the trade tax, which ensures that at least some 
basic elements of fiscal autonomy are guaranteed. 
Table  1.  Tax  Revenues  Assignments  Between  the  Central 
Government, the Federal States and the Municipalities in 2003 
(in EURO) 










tax  (4)  
100 %  -  -  60.75 billion 
Inheritance tax  -  100 %  -  3.069 billion 
Property Tax  -  -  100 %  9.076 billion 
Personal 
Income tax 
42.5 %  42.5 %  15 %  141.396 billion 
Value added tax 51.4 %  46.5 %  2.1 %  138.935 billion 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
50 %  50 %  -  - 0.426 billion (5) 
Interest rebate  44 %  44 %  12 %  29.846 billion 
Trade tax  14.8%  7.7%  77.5 %  24.533 billion 
Source: Werner (2003: p.83). 
Fiscal Autonomy of Germany's Municipalities   
The revenues of the municipalities and the municipal associations 
can  be  divided  into  four  categories:  tax  revenues,  revenues  from  fees, 
revenues  from  vertical  grants and  other revenues (see Table A2a and 
A2b).  
Tax revenues comprise both the tax revenues from local taxes as 
well  as  the  proportional  tax  revenues  of  the  regional  planning 
associations  derived  from  the  compound  taxes.  This  makes  particular sense  when  bearing  in  mind  that  in  1998  the  trading  capital  as  a 
component  of  the  trade  tax  was  abolished  and  simultaneously  the 
municipalities,  for  the  first  time,  were  granted  a  share  (6)  of  the 
revenues  from  the  value  added  tax,  and  it  will  thus  help  to  avoid 
distortions when examining the years 1997 vs. 1999. (7)  
The  municipalities'  revenues  are  derived  from  fees,  taxes  for 
specific purposes, licence fees, other administrative and business taxes 
as well as amounts and other similar fees are listed under fees in this 
paper.  
All current transfers from the states and the federal government 
to  the  local  authorities  in  the  form  of  vertical  grants  -- -  regardless  of 
whether they were earmarked for specific purposes or unconditional -- - 
have been recorded as grants. 
Other  revenues  of  the  local  authorities  include  income  from 
business activity, interest income, loan repayments, income from the sale 
of corporate holdings and income from the sale of fixed assets. 
In addition to classifying the total revenues of the municipalities 
according to their source of income, the municipalities' income from 1997 
and 1999 is classified according to the federal states.  
When calculating the revenue volume of the municipal budgets of 
the three city-states of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg, some distinction 
problems  arise.  These  three  federal  states  do  not  separate  their 
municipal budgets from their respective federal budgets and thus only 
have  a  federal  budget  (for  a  discussion  about  the  political  and  fiscal 
federalism see also Seitz, 2000; Spahn, 2000). Particularly when it comes 
to tax revenues, but also in the field of revenues from fees, the communal 
assessment of the three city-states makes it difficult to calculate their 
respective municipal revenues. The vertical grants, on the other hand, 
present  fewer  problems,  on  account of  the extensive  data available in 
connection with the fiscal equalisation system (LFA) among Germany's 
states.  
A prime example of the distinction problems can be found in the 
trade tax. Estimates can be drawn up if one wishes to determine how far 
the federal state of Berlin would apply a fictitious multiple to collect the 
trade tax hand-over rate from the municipality of Berlin. When it comes 
to  their  budgets  fees,  the  current  state  budgets  do  not  distinguish between fees imposed by the federal state of Hamburg and those imposed 
by the municipality of Hamburg.  
Taking into account the fact that the German states cannot set 
tax  rates  individually,  we  examine  fiscal  autonomy  of  Germany’s 
municipalities, introducing the variable FISCAUT, which is defined as 
follows:  
FISCAUT  =  total  local  revenues  /  GDP  of  the  respective  state        
   
State fiscal autonomy values have been derived, aggregating in a 
bottom  up  approach  communal  data  together.  Furthermore,  the  fiscal 
autonomy variable FISCAUT considers the respective federal state GDP 
to take into account the different economic disparities in West and East 
Germany, which still exist more than a decade after the reunification. To 
take  into  account  such  differences  is  important  as  Torgler  (2003) 
provides a comparison of tax morale between inhabitants of East and 
West Germany after its post-reunification periods using World Values 
Survey  data  of  1990  and  1997.  The  results  indicate  statistically 
significant  differences  between  East  Germany  and  West  Germany. 
However,  the  differences  between  East  and  West  seem  to  erode  over 
time.  
The measurement of tax autonomy as local tax revenues relative 
to total revenues is not reasonable and too short-winded for Germany. 
First the German local authorities participate in a tax sharing system 
and therefore they received 15% on the PIT, 12% of the interest income 
tax  and  2.2%  on  the  VAT.  Moreover  the  most  important  ‘‘own  local 
revenues’’ - the local trade tax -- - does not belong completely to the local 
authorities, because since the fiscal reform of 1969, it exists for the local 
trade  tax  the  instrument  ‘‘trade  tax  hand-over  rate",  which  can  be 
compared as a tax sharing between local, state and central government.   
Additionally,  there  are  still  inequalities  between  the  West  and 
East German in many aspects of every day life, which can be underlined 
by the fact that East Germany's municipalities are financed only with 
20% by taxes, while their western counterparts fund their expenditure 
with more than 42%. 
In  Germany  exists  in  every  federal  state  a  local  equalization 
system (kommunaler Finanzausgleich), which differs extremely between 
the states (see Werner, 2005). Every state has to transfer an amount of its  tax  revenues  to  the  local  authorities;  this  arrangement  is  called 
obligatory tax sharing (obligatorischer Steuerverbund). On the one hand,
the federal states have to distribute a part of their tax revenues to the 
cities, the rural districts and the municipalities but on the other hand, 
the  states  can  fix  the  volume  of  their  obligatory  tax  sharing 
independently.  Therefore  the  value  of  this  amount  ranges  between 
11.54%  in  Bavaria  and  26.66%  in  Mecklenburg-Western  Pomerania. 
Besides  the  obligatory  tax  sharing,  the  facultative  tax  sharing  exists 
(freiwilliger Steuerverbund), under which the states are able to give the 
local authorities a share of further revenues, such as the grants from the 
equalisation system among the federal states, grants from the central 
government because of economic weakness or the motor vehicle tax. To 
consider all these facts we measured in our calculations not tax revues 
rather all relevant financial source of the local authorities in relation to 
the GDP of the respective state. 
Theoretical Approach   
In  this  section  we  introduce  the  model  and  develop  our  main 
hypothesis and the predicted sign of the control variables to analyze in 
the next section in a multivariate analysis.  
In order to examine the correlation between tax morale and fiscal 
autonomy, the following two specifications are postulated: 
i L i i FISCAUT CTL TM ε β β β + + ⋅ + = 2 1 0       (1) 
i L i L i FISCAUT CTL p TM ε β β β β + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 3 2 1 0        (2)
First of all, it is important to note that we test a model of tax 
morale, not tax evasion or tax compliance. Thus, deterrence factors are 
not integrated in our first model. It can be argued that tax morale is a 
concept that reflects the shaping of people’s preferences with respect to 
tax cheating behavior and not a concept such as the audit probability 
that affects the likelihood of cheating at given preferences. Thus, audit 
probability  affects  tax  compliance  decisions,  but  not  tax  morale. 
Furthermore,  it  can  be  assumed  that  the perceived deterrence factors 
(especially  the  perceived  probability  of  detection),  which  vary  among 
individuals are expected to determine tax morale much stronger than an objective measurable proxy used in this paper. But, we were not able to 
collect this information in our study.  
On the other hand, if tax morale is seen as a good indicator of tax 
compliance, one may suggest to integrate also deterrence factors in the 
model. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) presented a formal model, showing 
that  the  extent  of  tax  evasion  is  negatively  correlated  with  the 
probability of detection and the degree of punishment. Thus, in a second 
estimation we check whether the deterrence plays a significant role in 
the determination of tax morale. We were only able to investigate the 
impact of audit probability on tax morale, due to the lack of variance of 
the  punishments  among  the  states.  As  an  approximation  for  the 
probability of detection, the number of tax clerks per 1000 taxpayers is 
used. (8) This proxy has been used in several previous studies (see, e.g., 
Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996; Frey and Feld, 2002; Torgler, 
2005),  although  it  can  be  criticized  that  the  variation  in  audit 
probabilities may not be an exact proxy for the level detection probability 
being related to the presence of large companies or number of firms and 
thus influenced by the composition of the tax files to be controlled.  
Using  two  specifications  has  also  the  advantage  to  check  the 
robustness of the results, because it can also be criticized that the audit 
probability may be endogenous.  
TMi denotes the individual degree of tax morale measured with 
the World Values Survey (year 1997) and European Values Survey (year 
1999) using the following  question: (9)  
‘‘Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you 
think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in 
between: ..... Cheating on tax if you have the chance (% ‘‘never 
justified’’  -- -  code  1  from  a  ten-point  scale  where  1=never  and 
10=always).’’ 
The dependent variable TAX MORALE is developed by recoding 
the  ten-point  scale  into  a  four-point  scale  (0  to  3),  with  the  value  3 
standing for ‘‘never justifiable’’.  The value of 0 is an aggregation of the 
last 7 scale points, which were rarely chosen.   
One  of  the  advantages  of  the  used  data  sets  is  that  they  are 
designed  as  wide-ranging  surveys,  which  reduces  the  probability  of 
participants being suspicious and of creating framing effects by other tax context  questions.  Certainly  it  can  be  discussed  whether  it  is  more 
adequate to  use an index instead of a single question to measure tax 
morale. However, using a single question avoids the problems associated 
with  the  construction  of  an  index.  Furthermore,  an  index  might  be 
constructed  so  that  it  fits  best  the  theoretical  argumentations.  As  we 
analyze  one  specific  country,  problems  based  on  differences  in  the 
interpretation of the question or a variation in the political institution 
which  may  influence  the  justifiability  of  evading  taxes  do  not  occur. 
Working with more than one survey and thus considering different time 
periods  allows for  some  determinants  to  reduce  biases  due  to  a ‘‘time 
specific mood’’. Certainly, there is still the problem that some individuals 
may  excuse  their  non-cooperative  behavior  in  the  past  by  declaring 
relatively  high  tax  morale  values.  Furthermore,  our  data  set  has  the 
disadvantage  that  we  cannot  correct  for  the  tax  pressure  that  an 
individual experience. It can be pointed out that a person may be again 
tax cheating if he/she feels that the tax bill is reasonable, but on the 
other  hand  be  less  opposed  to  it  if  a  high  level  of  tax  pressure  is 
experienced.  
Our  main  focus  in  this  paper  is  to  check  whether  tax  morale 
depends on the type of institutional settings. There are not many studies, 
which  systematically  analyze  the  influence  of  decentralization  on  tax 
morale  or  tax  compliance.  Torgler  (2004)  analyzed  the  correlation 
between  tax  morale  and  local  autonomy  in  Switzerland.  The  results 
indicate that higher local autonomy leads to higher tax morale. Thus, it 
is essential to analyze the institutional conditions under which citizens 
are more willing to pay their taxes, controlling in a multivariate analysis 
for  additional  factors.  This  is  the  backdrop  against  which  this  survey 
examines Germany's fiscal federalism FISCAUTL and, in particular, the 
finances  of  its  municipalities,  in  order  to  find  out  to  what  extent  the 
financial  situation  of  Germany's  municipalities  influences  tax  morale. 
Small  structures  have  the  advantage  that citizens’ preferences can be 
met  better.  There  is  an  intensive  every-day  interaction  between 
taxpayers  and  the  state.  Such  closeness  may  induce  trust  and  thus 
enhance tax morale. Preferences are more visible. Thus, decentralization 
moves the government closer to the people. Many economists point out 
the relevance of giving sub-national governments the taxing power (see, 
e.g.,  Bahl,  1999).  The  strength  of  decentralized  systems  is  a  better 
transparency of this input-output relationship. The tax system must be 
visible to the local taxpayers. Thus, we would hypothesize that a higher 
local autonomy leads to higher tax morale.  We  also  include  a  panel  of  control  variables  at  the  individual 
level.  Previous  studies  have  shown  the  relevance  to  control  for  socio-
demographic  and  socio-economic  factors  (for  an  overview,  see  Torgler,  
2003). Older people may have acquired more social capital (see Tittle,  
1980).  They  are  often  strongly  attached  to  the  community  (see 
Pommerehne and Weck Hannemann, 1996). Thus, we would predict that 
age correlates with a higher tax morale.  Such a result would also be in 
line criminology studies that report a negative relationship between age 
and rule  breaking  (see, e.g., Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). Evidence 
from the tax compliance literature and previous tax morale studies show 
the  tendency  that  men  are  less  compliant  than  women.  Also  the 
criminology literature (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990) and recent studies 
investigating  corruption  (see,  e.g.,  Swamy  et  al.,  2001)  indicate  such 
tendencies.  Based on the relatively high number of missing values, it 
was not possible to include the variable INCOME in the estimations. In 
our analysis it is essential to reduce the number of missing values and 
thus to maximize the number of observations at the state level to reduce 
possible biases. Instead of income we used another proxy for a person’s 
economic situation. The World Values Survey and the European Values 
Survey asked participants, where they classified themselves in relation 
to SOCIAL CLASS (i.e., upper class, middle class etc.). Finally, we also 
control  for  marital  and  employment  status.  The  literature  shows  the 
tendency that there especially exist strong differences between married 
and single people (in our estimations the reference group). Differences 
due to the employment status are less obvious, but showing a certain 
tendency that self-employed are ceteris paribus less willing to cooperate 
or to pay taxes compared to other people.  
In the analysis of partial correlations we use weighted ordered 
probit models.  Weighted ordered probit estimations are used to correct 
the samples and thus to get a reflection of the national distribution. The 
ordered probit models are relevant in such an analysis insofar as they 
help analyse the ranking information of the scaled dependent variable 
tax morale. However, as in the ordered probit estimation, the equation 
has  a  non-linear  form,  only  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  can  be  directly 
interpreted and not its size. Calculating the marginal effects is therefore 
a  method  to  find  the  quantitative  effect  that  a  variable  has  on  tax 
morale.  The  marginal  effect  indicates  the  change  in  the  share  of 
taxpayers (or the probability of) belonging to a specific tax morale level, 
when the independent variable increases by one unit. In all estimations 
the marginal effects are presented only for the highest tax morale value. Furthermore,  it  should  be  noticed  that  answers  as  ‘‘don’t  know’’  and 
missing values have been eliminated in all estimations.  
Empirical Evidence   
In  this  section  we  introduce  the  model  and  develop  our  main 
hypothesis and the predicted sign of the control variables to analyze in 
the next section in a multivariate analysis.  
Table  2a,  2b  and  2c present  the  first  results.  To  check  the 
robustness of the results, we present several estimations. First, we are 
going to use two different time periods in the empirical analysis. Eq 1. 
presents the results focusing on 1997, Eq. 2 on 1999. Eq. 3 pools the data 
together. In a next we present in Eq. 4 we present an estimation with 
standard  errors  adjusted  to  clustering  within  states,  as  it  can  be 
criticized that including fiscal autonomy as an aggregated state variable 
can  produce  downward  biased  standard  errors  (see,  e.g.,  Frey  and 
Stutzer, 2002). Thus, it is useful to check whether a correction regarding 
the standard errors has an effect on the significance level of our main 
variable. Eq. 5 and 6 also introduces our model 2, considering also audit 
probability  as  a  variable.  In  Eq.  6,  we  also  excluded  the  city-states 
Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen (see previous discussion). 
In  general,  the  fiscal  autonomy  coefficients  show  in  all 
estimations a statistically significant positive effect on tax morale, with 
similar quantitative effects. Thus, it looks as if our hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. The statistical significance and quantitative effects are lower 
excluding the three city-states. Furthermore, clustering leads to lower z-
values,  but  results  indicate  that  the  coefficient  is  still  statistically 
significant  at  the  0.10  level.  In  the  Tables  3a  and  3b  we  check  the 
robustness of the results conducting further estimations. For simplicity, 
we only report the coefficient for fiscal autonomy, but we controlled for 
the other factors. First we present in Table 3a 1997 and 1999 estimations 
without the city-- -states. In a next step we add a further variable in the 
estimations. It may be argued that obtained results may be driven by 
higher trust in the legal system, which measures how the relationship 
between  the  state  and  its  citizens  is  established.  (10)  We  present 
estimations with and without the city-states. In Table 3b we present the 
pooled estimations with and without city-states (also clustering within 
states and including the trust variable). All in all, the results obtained 
are  quite  robust.  In  most  of  the  cases  the  fiscal  autonomy  coefficient remains  statistically  significant  with  high  marginal  effects.  Only  the 
estimations without city-states clustering within states show z-values on 
the border of being statistically significant. However, it should be noticed 
that estimations without city-states have disadvantages of lower degrees 
of freedom. Interestingly, our trust variable has a strong impact on tax 
morale. An increase in the trust in the legal/justice system by one unit 
increases  the  share  of  subjects  indicating  the  highest  tax  morale  by 
around 5 percentage points. 
It  can  be  criticized  that  our  institutional  variable  may  be 
endogenous.  For  example,  better  institutions  may  lead  to  higher  tax 
morale, but in turn, it can be argued that taxpayers with a higher tax 
morale  may  choose  places  with  a  higher  level  of  local  autonomy. 
However,  first  of  all  the  levels  of  formal  institutions  such  as  fiscal 
autonomy are relatively stable over time. Furthermore, there are only 
limited possibilities for taxpayers in Germany to change the institutional 
structure  directly  via  political  participation  rights.  Finally,  it  can  be 
supposed  that  the  choice  of  location  is  strongly  influenced  by  other 
factors.  These  arguments  suggest  that  the  causality  may  run  from 
institutions  to  tax  morale  and  not  the  other  way  round.  However,  to 
check for possible causality problems, we conduct a Hausman Chi-square 
test for the fuller specifications (last two pooled estimations). In general, 
in  our  case,  it  is  not  easy  to  find  a  suitable  instrument  that  is 
uncorrelated  with  the  error  term  but  highly  correlated  with  our 
institutional  variable.  As  instrument  we  use  the  local  taxation  ratio 
(local tax revenues / total local revenues) divided by the GDP of their 
respective federal states. The data indicates that this instrument is not 
correlated with the error term (r=-0.045 and r=-0.054). Hausman Chi-
square  tests  reject  the  hypothesis  that  local  autonomy  is  endogenous. 
(11)  Nevertheless,  we  run  2SLS  regressions.  The  coefficient  of  fiscal 
autonomy remained highly statistically significant with t-values of 3.24 
in Eq. 5 and 2.72 in Eq. 6. 
Looking at our control variables, we observe that audit probability 
variable is statistically significant with a positive sign. This may indicate 
the relevance to also consider our model 2, although there are theoretical 
arguments  that  speak  against  it.  This  result  is  in  line  with  previous 
empirical findings focusing on tax evasion (see, e.g., Crane and Nourzad, 
1987; Witte and Woodbury, 1985; Dubin and Wilde, 1988; Joulfaien and 
Rider,  1996).  In  experiments there  is  also  the  tendency that a higher 
audit  rate  leads  to  more  compliance  (see,  e.g.,  Friedland  et  al.,  1978, Beck  et  al.,  1991;  Alm,  Jackson  and  McKee,  1992a,  1992b;  Alm, 
Cronshaw, and McKee, 1993; for a survey see Torgler, 2002).  
Tables 2a, 2b and 2c also indicate that socio-demographic factors 
matter. In line with previous studies age is positively correlated with a 
higher  tax  morale  and  women  report  a  higher  tax  morale  than  men 
(statistically significant in the pooled estimation, see Eq. 2 and 3). Being 
a  woman  rather  than  man  increases  the  probability  of  reporting  the 
highest  tax  morale  scale  between  4.8  and  6.6  percentage  points.  The 
pooled estimations and the results obtained using the 1997 data show 
that  being  married  rather  than  single  also  increases  the  share  of 
individuals  stating  that  tax  evasion  is  never  justifiable  by  around  5 
percentage points. On the other hand, no differences among the social 
classes are observed. (12) Finally, our findings indicate the tendency of 
an increase of tax morale over time in Germany.  Table 2a. Determinants of Tax Morale in Germany 
WEIGHTED  
ORDERED  1997      1999     
PROBIT  Coeff.  z-Stat.Marg. Coeff.  z-Stat.Marg.
DEPEND. V.: TAX 
MORALE       Effect       Effect 
INDEPENDENT V.  Eq. 1        Eq. 2       
AGE  0.009***3.10  0.004  0.010**  2.42  0.004 
WOMAN  0.167***2.69  0.066  0.123  1.56  0.048 
UPPER CLASS  -0.116  -1.47  -0.046 0.136  1.06  0.053 
MIDDLE CLASS  -0.163** -2.32  -0.065 0.038  0.49  0.015 
MARRIED  0.136*  1.82  0.054  0.064  0.56  0.025 
DIVORCED  0.07  0.56  0.028  0.101  0.65  0.039 
SEPARATED  0.035  0.14  0.014  0.249  0.83  0.094 
WIDOWED  0.051  0.37  0.02  0.105  0.60  0.041 
PART TIME EMPLOY.  0.004  0.04  0.002  0.133  0.94  0.051 
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.381** -2.00  -0.147 0.224  1.20  0.085 
UNEMPLOYED  0.111  1.04  0.044  -0.236*  -1.82  -0.094
AT HOME  0.152  1.27  0.06  0.370**  2.57  0.14 
STUDENT  -0.168  -1.30  -0.066 0.308  1.56  0.116 
RETIRED  0.357***3.22  0.142  0.176  1.31  0.068 
OTHER  0.443**  1.80  0.173  0.089  0.37  0.034 
FISCAUT  3.433***2.75  1.368  3.862***3.03  1.513 
YEAR 1999                   
Number of observations 1797       1905      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000       
Notes: Robust standard errors. Dependent variable: tax morale on a 
four point scale. In the reference group are, MAN, SINGLE, FULL 
TIME  EMPLOYED,  LOWEST  CLASS,  YEAR  1997.    Significance 
levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal 
effect = highest tax morale score (3). 1997 data (Eq. 1) is already a 
reflection of the national distribution. Thus, ordered probit has been 




pooled 1997 and 1999  pooled 1997 and 1999 
clustering within states 
PROBIT  Coeff.  z-Stat.Marg. Coeff.  z-Stat.Marg.
DEPEND. V.:  
TAX MORALE     Effect      Effect 
INDEPENDENT V.  Eq. 3        Eq. 4       
AGE  0.009***  3.73  0.004  0.009***  3.23  0.004 
WOMAN  0.147***  2.96  0.058  0.147***  3.65  0.058 
UPPER CLASS  -0.012  -0.18  -0.005 -0.012  -0.11  -0.005
MIDDLE CLASS  -0.045  -0.85  -0.018 -0.045  -0.59  -0.018
MARRIED  0.112*  1.78  0.045  0.112*  1.83  0.045 
DIVORCED  0.083  0.87  0.033  0.083  0.77  0.033 
SEPARATED  0.088  0.46  0.035  0.088  0.49  0.035 
WIDOWED  0.088  0.82  0.035  0.088  0.80  0.035 
PART TIME 
EMPLOYED  0.062  0.73  0.025  0.062  0.90  0.025 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.038  0.28  0.015  0.038  0.17  0.015 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.016  -0.19  -0.006 -0.016  -0.17  -0.006
AT HOME  0.285***  2.91  0.112  0.285***  2.76  0.112 
STUDENT  0.091  0.79  0.036  0.091  1.07  0.036 
RETIRED  0.265***  3.07  0.104  0.265***  2.86  0.104 
OTHER  0.193  1.07  0.076  0.193*  1.66  0.076 
FISCAUT  3.991***  4.42  1.588  3.991*  1.65  1.588 
YEAR 1999  0.204***  4.50  0.081  0.204  1.51  0.081 
Number of 
observations  3702       3702      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000       
Notes:  Robust  standard errors.  Dependent variable:  tax  morale  on  a 
four  point  scale.  In  the  reference  group  are,  MAN,  SINGLE,  FULL 
TIME EMPLOYED, LOWEST CLASS, YEAR 1997.  Significance levels: 
* 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = 
highest tax morale score (3).Table  2c.  Determinants  of  Tax  Morale  in  Germany  (Pooled 
Estimations with Deterrence) 
WEIGHTED ORDERED
  
pooled 1997 and 1999 pooled 1997 and 1999 
without cities states 
PROBIT  Coeff. 
z-
Stat. Marg. Coeff. 
z-
Stat. Marg.
DEPEND. V.:  
TAX MORALE      Effect      Effect 
INDEPENDENT V.  Eq. 5        Eq. 6       
AUDIT PROBABILITY  0.057*** 2.70  0.023  0.107*** 3.60  0.043 
AGE  0.009*** 3.76  0.004  0.010*** 3.82  0.004 
WOMAN  0.149*** 3.00  0.059  0.144*** 2.81  0.057 
UPPER CLASS  -0.013  -0.20 -0.005 0.003  0.04  0.001 
MIDDLE CLASS  -0.042  -0.79 -0.017 -0.025  -0.46 -0.01 
MARRIED  0.123*  1.94  0.049  0.139**  2.12  0.055 
DIVORCED  0.079  0.83  0.032  0.096  0.96  0.038 
SEPARATED  0.101  0.53  0.04  0.144  0.73  0.057 
WIDOWED  0.091  0.85  0.036  0.073  0.65  0.029 
PART TIME EMPL.  0.056  0.66  0.022  0.093  1.04  0.037 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.019  0.14  0.008  -0.006  -0.04 -0.002
UNEMPLOYED  -0.016  -0.19 -0.006 -0.014  -0.17 -0.006
AT HOME  0.285*** 2.91  0.111  0.277*** 2.74  0.108 
STUDENT  0.09  0.78  0.036  0.119  0.98  0.047 
RETIRED  0.267*** 3.09  0.105  0.252*** 2.82  0.099 
OTHER  0.192  1.06  0.075  0.285  1.52  0.111 
FISCAUT  2.863*** 2.90  1.139  1.866*  1.70  0.742 
YEAR 1999  0.209*** 4.61  0.083  0.225*** 4.77  0.089 
Number of observations  3702       3475      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000       
Notes:  Robust  standard errors.  Dependent variable:  tax  morale  on  a 
four  point  scale.  In  the  reference  group  are,  MAN,  SINGLE,  FULL 
TIME EMPLOYED, LOWEST CLASS, YEAR 1997.  Significance levels: 
* 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = 
highest tax morale score (3). Table 3a.  Robustness Check 
WEIGHTED ORDERED           
PROBIT  Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg.
DEPEND. V.: TAX MORALE     Effect
INDEPENDENT V. (ALL OTHER 
CONTROLLED)          
ESTIMATION 1997 without city states       
FISCAUT  3.532***  2.80  1.407 
ESTIMATION 1999 without city states       
FISCAUT  3.689***  2.89  1.445 
INTRODUCING A FURTHER VARIABLE     
ESTIMATION 1997       
FISCAUT  4.035***  3.16  1.607 
TRUST IN THE LEGAL/JUSTICE SYSTEM  0.118***  2.9  0.047
ESTIMATION 1997 without city states       
FISCAUT  4.049***  3.13  1.613 
TRUST IN THE LEGAL/JUSTICE SYSTEM  0.112***  2.69  0.045 
ESTIMATION 1999       
FISCAUT  3.741***  2.89  1.467 
TRUST IN THE LEGAL/JUSTICE SYSTEM  2.890***  2.71  0.054 
ESTIMATION 1999 without city states       
FISCAUT  3.554***  2.74  1.392 
TRUST IN THE LEGAL/JUSTICE SYSTEM  0.159***  3.05  0.062 
Notes:  Robust  standard  errors.  In  all  estimations  all  other  control 
variables  are  used  previously  are  included  but  not  reported  using 
specification  (1).  In the reference group are, MAN, SINGLE, FULL 
TIME EMPLOYED, LOWEST CLASS. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p 
< 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax 
morale score (3).  Table 3b.  Robustness Check (Pooled Estimations) 
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT  Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg.
DEPEND. V.: TAX MORALE     Effect
INDEPENDENT V. (ALL OTHER 
CONTROLLED)          
POOLED ESTIMATION 1997 and 1999        
without city states clustering within 
states       
FISCAUT  3.967  1.59  1.578 
INTRODUCING A FURTHER 
VARIABLE        
POOLED ESTIMATION 1997 and 1999        
FISCAUT  3.688***  3.95  1.468 
TRUST IN THE LEGAL/JUSTICE SYSTEM 0.139***  4.35  0.055
POOLED ESTIMATION 1997 and 1999         
without city states       
FISCAUT  3.628***  3.84  1.444 
TRUST IN THE LEGAL/JUSTICE SYSTEM 0.147***  4.46  0.058
POOLED ESTIMATION 1997 and 1999        
clustering within states       
FISCAUT  4.277*  1.69  1.703 
TRUST IN THE LEGAL/JUSTICE SYSTEM 0.120**  2.45  0.048 
POOLED ESTIMATION 1997 and 1999        
without city states clustering within 
states       
FISCAUT  4.246  1.62  1.69 
TRUST IN THE LEGAL/JUSTICE SYSTEM 0.128**  2.57  0.051 
Notes:  Robust  standard  errors.  In  all  estimations  all  other  control 
variables  are  used  previously  are  included  but  not  reported  using 
specification  (1).  In  the  reference  group  are,  MAN,  SINGLE,  FULL 
TIME EMPLOYED, LOWEST CLASS, YEAR 1997. Significance levels: 
* 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = 
highest tax morale score (3).  Conclusions    
Empirical  and  experimental  findings  in  the  tax  compliance 
literature have shown that the standard model of tax evasion based on 
an expected utility maximization approach predicts a higher degree of 
tax evasion than observed. Thus, the tax compliance puzzle is why people 
pay taxes. It has been argued that tax morale might explain such a high 
compliance.  However,  hardly  any  empirical  study  has  analysed  what 
shapes  tax  morale.  This  paper  tries  to  fill  this  gap  by  analysing  tax 
morale as a dependent variable using German data from 1997 and 1999 
to  investigate  whether  there  is  a  correlation  between  tax  morale  and 
fiscal  autonomy.  Thus,  special  attention  has  been  given  to  a 
constitutional variable, which has rarely been analysed in the empirical 
tax compliance literature.  
It is interesting to investigate Germany because German’s fiscal 
federalism  has  undergone  a  process  of  perpetual  reform.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  relative  tax  revenues  have  decreased  due  to  the  economic 
development in Germany, on the other hand, some tax sources that have 
existed up to now -- - the corporate income tax is a good example in this 
context -- - will shortly be phased out because of changes in the system. In 
addition, other incidents, such as the judgement by the Constitutional 
Court  in  Karlsruhe,  require  a  constant  renewal  of  Germany's  fiscal 
federalism. (13) Thus, we have developed a proxy that measures fiscal 
autonomy  coefficient  (FISCAUT)  for  German  states,  based  on 
accumulated  communal  data.  (14)  The  tendency  has  been  found  that 
higher  fiscal  autonomy  leads  to  higher  tax  morale  controlling  in  a 
multivariate  analysis  for  additional  factors.  Furthermore,  this  effect 
tends  to  persist  after  several  robustness  checks  using  different 
specifications.  Consequently,  it  seems  to  be  essential  to  maintain  or 
increase the level of fiscal autonomy to improve the level of tax morale 
and thus the willingness of citizens to pay taxes and thus to contribute to 
the society.  
It will be interesting to observe whether fiscal federalism reform 
tendencies in Germany will have an impact on tax morale in Germany in 
the future.  Appendix  
Table A1. Abbreviations of the German States 
  German  English 





THUE  Thüringen  Thuringia 
SACH  Sachsen  Saxony 
BRG  Brandenburg  Brandenburg 
SAAR  Saarland  Saarland 
NDS  Niedersachsen  Lower Saxony 
RP  Rheinland-Pfalz  Rhineland-Palatinate 
SH  Schleswig-Holdstein  Schleswig-Holstein 
NRW  Nordrhein-Westfalen  North Rhine-Westphalia 
BW  Baden-Württemberg  Baden-Wuerttemberg 
BAY  Bayern  Bavaria 
HE  Hessen  Hesse 
BE  Berlin  Berlin 
HH  (Hansestadt) Hamburg (Hanseatic city) Hamburg
HB  (Hansestadt) Bremen  (Hanseatic city) Bremen Table  A2a.  The  Revenue  Breakdown  of  the  German  Local 
Authorities  Classified  of  Each  Federal  State  of  1997  (in  1000 
EURO)
  Tax 
Revenues 




NRW  12,820,440 8,085,160 18,402,930 3,504,750  42,813,280
BAY  8,222,340  4,736,910 10,388,020 2,042,460  25,389,730
BW  7,025,920  3,050,570 8,687,670  2,641,950  21,406,110
NDS  4,501,210  2,628,500 8,000,900  971,660  16,102,270
HE  4,767,490  2,457,320 5,257,410  1,200,050  13,682,270
SACH  1,188,500  1,169,840 5,402,260  1,476,660  9,237,260 
RP   2,321,320  764,480  3,444,110  564,520  7,094,430 
S-A  654,710  354,530  4,382,590  397,680  5,789,510 
SH  1,598,450  1,057,450 2,404,350  754,820  5,815,070 
THUE 527,240  492,780  3,150,730  433,930  4,604,680 
BRG  690,190  692,440  4,390,970  423,910  6,197,510 
M-V  413,790  506,080  2,607,080  340,260  3,867,210 
SAAR  580,210  275,430  1,126,530  137,180  2,119,350 
Table  A2b.  The  Revenue  Breakdown  of  the  German  Local 
Authorities  Classified  of  Each  Federal  State  of  1999  (in  1000 
EURO) 
  Tax 
Revenues 
Fees        Grants       





NRW  14,001,800  7,821,400 17,689,800  6,122,600  45,635,600
BAY  9,080,900  4,504,300 10,502,400  5,235,800  29,323,400
BW  8,957,500  3,447,600 9,453,800  3,803,100  25,662,000
NDS  4,993,400  2,573,600 8,765,600  2,071,400  18,404,000
HE  5,551,200  2,263,900 5,611,500  1,852,000  15,279,200
SACH  1,474,300  999,100  5,047,100  2,029,300  9,549,800 
RP   2,512,100  1,423,100 3,711,300  1,836,800  9,483,300 
S-A  788,600  604,500  4,805,600  987,800  7,186,500 
SH  1,717,200  926,900  2,508,800  1,001,800  6,154,700 
THUE 647,500  462,600  3,677,300  691,800  5,479,200 
BRG  804,300  694,800  4,280,700  851,400  6,631,200 
M-V  489,600  484,200  2,362,800  719,800  4,056,400 
SAAR  571,100  251,800  1,100,100  201,500  2,124,500 Notes 
1. We are grateful for helpful comments by Lars P. Feld, William F. 
Fox,  Michael  Lombardo,  Paul  Bernd  Spahn  and  two  anonymous 
referees.  The authors have additionally benefited from comments of 
participants of the Annual Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik in 
Dresden  (09/2004).  Financial  support  from  the  the  Max  Geldner-
Stiftung, the Janggen-Pöhn-Stifung, the FAG (Freiwillige Akademische 
Gesellschaft),  and  the  University  of Basel  (Fonds  zur Förderung des 
Akademischen Nachwuchs)  is gratefully acknowledged. Furthermore, 
we  would  like  to  thank  the  support  obtained  from  the  Department 
‘‘Gemeindeverzeichnis’’ and ‘‘Steuerstatistiken’’ of the Federal Statistic 
Office  as  well  as  the  Oberfinanzdirektion  Münster.    The  findings, 
interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper rare entirely 
those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the view of the 
World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
2.  Compared  to  corresponding  publications  by  the  OECD,  the  World 
Bank or USAID, however, the GFS by the IMF is unique worldwide. 
3. In France, there were altogether 36,679 municipalities in 1999, of 
which about 32,000 municipalities had fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. 
Yet,  Germany  is  far  from  creating  a  realigned  municipal  structure, 
which Denmark did when it reformed its territories in 1970.  
4. Tax on mineral oil, electricity, tobacco, spirits, coffee and sparkling 
wine.  
5. The negative revenues of the corporate income are the results of a 
tax reform, which includes change from the full imputation system to 
the half-income system.  
6. In 1998, the trading capital tax as another component of the trade 
tax was abolished in West Germany and the municipalities were given 
a 2.2 per cent share of value added tax revenues to compensate for the 
shortfall. In the new federal states of east Germany, the trading capital 
tax was never imposed. The local portion on the VAT is not  distributed 
per capita. In a first step the complete local revenues will be divided by 
85:15 between the west and the east federal states. Secondly, the cities 
and  municipalities  received  their  portion  on  a  complex  equalisation formula. Generally,  the main features of this equalisation formula are 
based on respective local amount from the trade tax and the number of 
local employees. Therefore, the revenues from the trade tax have an 
huge impact on the revenues from the fixed portion on VAT of every 
city, because a city with a high amount of the trade tax also receive  
high tax revenue from the VAT.      
   
7.  Only  net  tax  revenues  have  been  accounted.  This  means,  for 
example, that the tax sharing of the trade tax between municipalities 
and  rural  districts  because  of  apportionment  of  school  buildings  or 
similar circumstances have been stricken from the  balance.  
8. Tax clerks are defined as the number of occupied position (excluding 
the  vacant  positions)  in  the  tax  administration.  It  includes  also  the 
employees  of  the  federal  ministry  of  finance  and  the 
Oberfinanzdirektionen (OFD) whereas the employees of the custom and 
duty  administration  have  been  struck  off  this  balance.  Moreover  all 
staff members of the local tax authorities are included in this balance 
of the years 1997 and 1999. The number of taxpayers in each state is 
based on the income and wage statistics 1998.  
9. Both surveys cover a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and 
political change. These representative surveys have assessed the basic 
values and beliefs of people around the world and have been carried out 
in  about  80  societies  representing  over  80  per  cent  of  the  world’s 
population. The samples are required to be selected using probability 
random  methods,  and  the  questions  contained  within  the  surveys 
generally do not deviate far from the original official questionnaire. For 
a  sample  of  a  typical  World  Values  Survey  see 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
10.  Could  you  tell  me  how  much  confidence  you  have  in  the  legal 
(WVS)/justice system (EVS): is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot 
of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (4= a great deal 
to 1=none at all). 
11. The Hausman test allows us to test whether there is a sufficient 
difference  between  the  coefficients  of  the  instrumental  variable 
regression  and  those  of  the  used  regression.  For  example,  the  
Prob>chi2 values are 1.000 for Eq. 5, 0.932 and 0.945 for Eq. 6.  This 
indicates  that  our  used  regression  is  a  consistent  estimator  for  this 
equation. 12. It should be noticed that the social status has been coded slightly 
different in 1997 (upper class; upper middle class; lower middle class; 
working  class;  lower  class)  compared  to  1999  (upper,  upper  middle 
class;  middle,  non-manual  workers;  skilled  and  semi-skilled  manual 
workers, unskilled workers, and unemployed used as reference group). 
Coding in the pooled estimation: Upper, upper middle class: UPPER; 
middle,  lower  middle  class:  MIDDLE,  all  others:  LOWEST 
(REFERENCE GROUP). 
13.  The  states  of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse have filed 
successfully a lawsuit at Germany's Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. 
For  this  reason,  on  23rd  June  2001,  the  states  and  the  central 
government agreed on a reform of the fiscal equalization system, which 
will come into force from 2005 onwards and will last until 2019. 
14. We have to emphasize again, that the federal states do not have the 
right to levy a tax rate on one of the  major taxes. This missing link of 
political accountability seems for us the biggest erroneous trend in the 
German  Fiscal  Federalism.  Therefore  we  have  chosen  the  local 
authorities, which are allowed to fix a local tax rate on the trade tax 
and property tax. Moreover the distribution of the fixed portion on VAT 
is mainly influenced by the respective local amount from the trade tax 
(and the number of local employees). 
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